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COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW
This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey is devoted to those
decisions involving bankruptcy, banking, government contracts,
debtor-creditor, and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) rendered by the Tenth Circuit during the 1975-76 survey period.
Discussion of each case is limited in length and is not intended
to be exhaustive. It is the author's desire that this section serve
as a research tool for the practicing lawyer, and it is written with
this intent.
Few of the decisions in the survey period presented major
developments or changes in the law. However, a large number are
noteworthy because of either the isolated application of the law
or the facts of the case. In addition, a case comment concerning
banking law follows this overview.'
A.

I.
Scope of Rule 401(a)

BANKRUPTCY

On October 1, 1973, Rule 401(a) of the Bankruptcy Court
became effective. 2 This rule provides that the filing of a petition
for bankruptcy shall operate as an automatic injunction prohibiting either legal actions or the enforcement of judgments founded
on unsecured provable debts.' Zestee Foods, Inc. v. PhillipsFood
Corp.,' dealt with the operation of Rule 401(a) in a situation
where both service of a garnishee summons and adjudication of
the debtor's bankruptcy occurred prior to the effective date of the
rule.
Zestee had obtained a judgment in excess of $60,000 against
Phillips. Subsequently, on November 24, 1972, a petition was
The comment discusses Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221 (10th
Cir. 1976), and Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
Rule 401(a) provides:
Stay of Actions-The filing of a petition shall operate as a stay of the commencement or continuation of any action against the bankrupt, or the enforcement of any judgment against him, if the action or judgment is founded
on an unsecured provable debt other than one not dischargable under clause
(1), (5), (6), or (7) or § 17a of the Act.
Bankruptcy R. 401(a), 11 U.S.C. App. R. 401(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
Id.
536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976).
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filed in involuntary bankruptcy against Phillips. On December
12, 1972, Zestee caused a garnishment summons to be served on
a party indebted to Phillips. Phillips was adjudicated a bankrupt
six days later.'
The garnishee sought adjudication as to whether the trustee
of the bankrupt's estate or Zestee was entitled to the funds owed.
However, the case remained dormant until 1975, at which time
the trustee moved to dismiss the garnishee summons. The motion
was granted and Zestee appealed, asserting that Rule 401(a)
could not affect an adjudication of bankruptcy occurring prior to
its effective date.'
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Doyle, held that Rule 401(a)
applied to all bankruptcy proceedings and legal actions not completed as of the effective date: "The Rule declares that the stay
is in effect during the continuation of any action of the enforcement of any judgment. The . . . submission of the garnishee
summons is part of the enforcement efforts of Zestee. By the
specific terms of the rule the automatic stay takes effect. ' ' 7 Since
Phillips was adjudicated bankrupt, Rule 401(b) applied to make
the stay continuous.
Two other reasons were advanced for upholding dismissal of
the garnishment summons. First, the court noted that, notwithstanding the automatic stay provided in Rule 401(a), the bankruptcy court had expressly enjoined the garnishment on November 5, 1973.1 Further, the court determined that the garnishment
summons could not be effective since title to the assets affected
Id. at 335.
Id.
7 Id. See note 2 supra.
' Rule 401(b) provides:
Durationof Stay-Except as it may be deemed annulled under subdivision
(c) or may be terminated, annulled, or modified by the bankruptcy court
under subdivision (d) or (c) of this rule, the stay shall continue until the
bankruptcy case is dismissed or the bankrupt is denied a dischargeor waives
or otherwise loses his right thereto.
Bankruptcy R. 401(b), 11 U.S.C. App. R. 401(b) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis
added).
1 536 F.2d at 335. Under Rule 401(e) the bankruptcy court has the authority to
expressly grant appropriate injunctive relief. Bankruptcy R. 401(e), 11 U.S.C. App. R.
401(e) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). See also, Bankruptcy Act § 17(c)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(4),
(1970).
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had legally passed to the trustee under section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act" as of the date the petition was filed."
Zestee is a reminder that proceedings in bankruptcy are subject to both present and future regulations until the proceedings
are terminated. Therefore, it is imperative that all parties to a
bankruptcy proceeding note with a watchful eye all changes in
the rules and evaluate the effect of those changes throughout the
proceedings.
B.

Post-PetitionInterest

Ordinarily, unsecured creditors are not entitled to recover
interest accruing on a debt after the filing of a petition for bankruptcy. In Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.
First National City Bank (In re King Resources Co.) 3 the Tenth
Circuit grappled with the rights of a senior creditor to recover
post-petition interest under a subordination agreement with
other creditors.
As a condition to a loan, Continental required King Resources to provide for the subordination of certain outstanding
debentures. King Resources subsequently underwent Chapter X
reorganization. Continental asserted the right to post-petition
interest out of the shares of the subordinated creditors, basing its
claim on general subordination provisions contained in indentures dealing with the subordinated debt. The trustee denied
recovery of the post-petition interest. 4
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's disallowance of
post-petition interest.' 5 Following the rules established in In re
Kingsboro Mortgage Corp.' and In re Times Sales Finance
" 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
" 536 F.2d at 336. Zestee argued that service of the garnishee summons resulted in
the creation of a preferential transfer and that the trustee had failed to file suit to set aside
the transfer within the two year statute of limitations. Id. See Bankruptcy Act § 11(e), 11
U.S.C. § 29(e) (1970). The court found that even if it were assumed that service of a
garnishee summons was capable of transferring property, there was no preferential transfer here; the summons was served after the petition was filed and therefore the property
had vested in the trustee. 536 F.2d at 336.
11Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re King
Resources Co.), 528 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1976).
*3528 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1976).
* Id. at 791.
' Id. at 792.
514 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Corp.,' the court held that a subordinate agreement will not give
a senior unsecured creditor the right to post-petition interest absent explicit language in the agreement to that effect. 8
C.

"Fiduciary Capacity" under Section 17a(4)

Allen v. Romero (In re Romero)"5 represents a possible expansion of the concept of fiduciary capacity under section 17a(4) of
the Bankruptcy Act. 0 Allen hired Romero, a licensed contractor
in New Mexico, to build three four-plexes at a stated price. Allen
then advanced funds to Romero with the understanding that
these funds would be used to pay subcontractors, materialmen,
and laborers as payments became due, thus avoiding the imposition of liens on the properties. Romero did not use these funds as
agreed and liens were filed on the structures. The bankruptcy
court found that Romero owed a sum in excess of $54,00021 to
Allen, and further concluded that this debt was non22
dischargeable under sections 17a(2) and (4) of the Act.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed this judgment on the basis of
section 17a(4) .23Noting that section 17a(4) required the existence
of a fiduciary relationship and further noting that this fiduciary
capacity was limited to "technical" and not implied trusts, the
court held that the provisions of the New Mexico contractor's
licensing statute created the necessary relationship. 4 The statute
17 491

F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1974).
" 528 F.2d at 792. Cf. Allen v. Romero (In re Romero), 535 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1976)
(which reaffirms that post-petition interest is always recoverable on a non-dischargeable
debt).
" 535 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(4) (1970). Subsection (a)(4) makes non-dischargeable those debts
that "were created by [the bankrupt's] fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." Id.
2 Although the judgment of the bankruptcy court against the bankrupt was affirmed
on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reduced the award from $54,708.30 to $53,143.43. This
reduction was ordered due to a finding by the Tenth Circuit that the amount in question
was either an error in mathematical computation or an improper award for mental suffering.
22 535 F.2d at 621. Bankruptcy Act §§ 17(a)(2), (4), 11 U.S.C. 535(a)(2), (4) (1970).
" 535 F.2d at 621. The Tenth Circuit selected 17(a)(4) as the appropriate provision,
although the court might have been able to affirm the judgment on section 17(a)(2) which
makes non-dischargeable "liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations .... " See note 14 supra.
24 535 F.2d at 621-22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-35-1 to -67 (1953) provides for the
licensing of persons involved in the construction industry.
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provided that a license was subject to revocation or suspension in
the event that the licensee wrongfully diverted such advances."
The implication arising from this case is that section 17a(4)
may be applied to all licensed practices if the terms of the license
provide some duty or condition which can be construed as creating a statutory obligation on the licensee. Accordingly, the terms
and conditions of any license should be carefully considered during investigation of any section 17a(4) claims.
D.

Comity in the Bankruptcy Court
HT v. Lam (In re The Colorado Corp.)26 involved a contested
provisional disallowance of certain alleged creditors prior to the
election of a trustee.27 Appellants, IT and Venture Fund,2" had
been declared in liquidation by courts in Luxembourg and the
Netherlands Antilles prior to this proceeding. Liquidators appointed in the foreign proceeding filed substantial claims against
the Colorado Corporation, the bankrupt. The Tenth Circuit
found that the bankruptcy court's disallowance was an abuse of
discretion based on an erroneous denial of comity. 21
The appellees argued that the foreign court orders appointing
the liquidators should not be recognized in American courts and
therefore the liquidators had no authority to represent IT and
Venture Fund in the proceedings. This argument was based on
the assertion that Canadian courts had not given comity to Colorado bankruptcy court orders and the claim that Canadian citizens had procured the foreign decrees involved. The Tenth Circuit noted that reciprocity has been a consideration in granting
or withholding comity but held that "[d]enying comity to the
Netherlands Antilles order because of lack of reciprocity in Canada is such a misdirected use of the reciprocity consideration as
2 N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-35-26 (1953) provides for the revocation or suspension of a
license on the grounds of diversion of funds received for the prosecution or completion of
a contract. The Tenth Circuit viewed this section as imposing "a fiduciary duty on contractors who have been advanced money pursuant to construction contracts." 535 F.2d at
6 2 1.21 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976).

" Because their claims were provisionally disallowed, petitioners were not allowed to
vote in the election of a trustee in bankruptcy. Id. at 466.
" IT and Venture Fund were part of Robert Vesco's 10S operation. The Colorado
Corporation was part of the John King empire. Id. at 464.
" Id. at 469.
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to constitute an abuse of discretion.""0 Comity is withheld when
recognition of the foreign law would prejudice the forum's citizens. Allowing foreign creditors to vote for a trustee who is subject
to American law could not prejudice American citizens. 3
The court went on to hold that the filing of a claim is prima
facie evidence of the claim and its validity." Therefore, the burden of proof rests upon the party seeking provisional disallowance
of the claim, which burden was not carried in this case. 3
E.

Preferential Transfers

Boyd v. FirstNational Bank (In re J & J Sales, Inc.)34 emphasizes the need to affirmatively prove some aspect of insolvency
before a transaction may be voided as preferential or fraudulent
under the Bankruptcy Act. 5 The trustee petitioned for a turnover order claiming that the bank illegally transferred $8,012.98
from the account of a bankrupt corporation and applied it toward
the personal indebtedness of individual stockholder officers. The
bankruptcy judge and the district court denied the petition and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. and Mrs. Tilley were the sole stockholders and officers
of J & J Sales, Inc., the bankrupt. Over a considerable period of
time the bank had been in the practice of making personal loans
to the Tilleys of funds needed to operate the business. The Tilleys
would loan these funds to the bankrupt and periodically repay
themselves when money was available. On October 25, 1972, a
large check was deposited in the business account and, on Mrs.
Tilley's direction, $8,012.98 of the proceeds was applied by the
bank to satisfy an outstanding loan of the Tilleys' that had been
in default. J & J Sales filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition
about five weeks later.
The Tenth Circuit found that a turn-over order could not be
3"

Id. at 468.

31

Id.

312

Id. at 467, 469.

Appellants also objected to the claims on the grounds that iT and Venture Fund
no longer had any legal existence, and therefore the liquidators had no right to press claims
on their behalf in the United States. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, holding
that the orders of the court in Luxemburg were sufficient to grant the liquidators authority
to pursue the claims. Id. at 469.
" No. 74-1364 (10th Cir., Oct. 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
31 Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107 (1970).
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based on the preference theory" because there was no evidence
that the transfer was made while the bankrupt was insolvent. An
essential element of a preference is that the transfer was made by
the debtor while insolvent and within four months of filing the
petition. 7 The burden of proving insolvency on the date of the
transfer rests with the trustee. 8
Nor would the evidence support an order based on the fraudulent transfer theory.3" There was no evidence that the debtor
was, or would be, rendered insolvent by the transfer 0 or that the
property remaining in the debtor after the transfer was unreasonably small capital.4 Similarly, there was no proof that the transfer was intended to hinder or defeat creditors42 or that the transfer
by a debtor who believed he
was made without fair consideration
3
would become insolvent.
F. Brief Mention
First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Sand Springs State Bank"
dealt with the jurisdictional parameters of the bankruptcy court.
Two creditors contested title to certain assets of the bankrupt.
The trustee conceded that one of the two was entitled to the
assets, and that the determination of the dispute would not affect
the bankrupt's estate. Under these circumstances the Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to resolve
the dispute,4 5 because the determination did not materially affect
the administration of the estate."6
Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), (b), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)(1), (b) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 60(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970). See Moran Bros., Inc. v.
Yinger, 323 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1963) for an explanation of section 60.
38 Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390-91 (10th Cir.), appeal
dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1955).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2), (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2), (3) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(a), (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a), (3) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(b), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(b) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d)(2)(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(c) (1970).
528 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 353-54. Although the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the parties on
appeal, the court raised this issue on its own motion. Id. at 353.
" See generally Bankruptcy Act §§ 1, 2, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11 (1970). Under the facts
of this case the resolution of the conflict between the creditors had no effect upon the
remaining overall debts of the bankrupt and the distribution of assets to the creditors.
Obviously, it had a direct effect on determining which creditor was entitled to receive the
secured assets, and therefore full payment, in contrast to the general creditors' shares of
'7
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Booker v. Booker (In re Booker)47 serves as a reminder that a
property settlement is dischargeable in bankruptcy whereas an
alimony judgment is not.8 Since the court order in question was
ambiguous the court construed the order from its terms, concluding that it was intended as a property settlement and was therefore dischargeable.

4

In Adams Chevrolet Co. v. Bollinger (In re Bollinger),50 the
bankrupt bought a car, falsely claiming that a trade-in car was
unencumbered. The court found the debt to be nondischargeable
under section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act" notwithstanding
lack of ill-will of the bankrupt. 52 The court noted that the requirement that a conversion be "willful" and "malicious" was satisfied
by the performance of an intentional act,53 absent just cause or
excuse, which necessarily produces harm.
II.

BANKS AND BANKING

In Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors," the Tenth Circuit
refused to interfere in a federal decision to create a federally-55
chartered bank pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act,
even though the Colorado banking authorities had reviewed and
denied an identical application for a state bank. This case is the
subject of a comment immediately following this Overview.
United Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.5 is nota-

ble because of its construction of language contained in a banker's
blanket bond. The bond covered losses that occurred while funds
the remaining assets. It would appear that if one creditor's claim against the bankrupt
materially differed from the other's as to priority or amount, then the bankruptcy court
might have had jurisdiction.
, No. 75-1733 (10th Cir., May 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).

, Under 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970), alimony judgments are nondischargeable in
bankruptcy.
" In construing the ambiguous order, the court considered the presence of indemnification, acceleration, and lien provisions to enforce the debt as some evidence that the
order was a property settlement and not an alimony judgment.
No. 76-1221 (10th Cir., July 28, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1970). See note 16 supra.
" No. 76-1221 at 4-5.
" Id. See McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916); Bennett v. W.T. Grant Co.,
481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
" 535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1850 (1970).
' 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976).
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were in transit, prior to "delivery at destination."5 7 The court
determined that the purpose of the blanket bond was to provide
coverage in the event of loss while funds were in transit but not
in the custody of an insured carrier.58 In light of this purpose and
the language of the bond, the court held that the bond covered
the loss of a cash letter which was delivered to an employee of the
recipient bank at a bus station and stolen from the employee
while in the bank's outdoor mall, but prior to entering the build59

ing.

Finally, in Colorado ex rel. State Banking Board v. First
NationalBank, 0 the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and
held that electronic banking facilities were "branch banks"
within the meaning of the federal laws prohibiting branch banking.' The district court had held that the use of these facilities
to receive deposits was branch banking under state and federal
laws, but that use for withdrawal and transfer of funds was not.,2
Since the district court decision, other circuits had concluded that electronic banking facilities were branch banks when
used for these other purposes as well. 3 The Tenth Circuit adopted
the rules of these cases, concluding that although the technology
and services differed somewhat from the statutory definition, the
intent and purpose of the Act 4 mandated the inclusion of these
5 The exact language of the bond placed in dispute provided for insurance coverage
[wihile the Property is in transit anywhere in the custody of any of the
Employees or partners of the Insured or of any other person or persons acting
as messenger, except while in the mail or with a carrier for hire other than
an armored motor vehicle company for the purpose of transportation, such
transit to begin immediately upon receipt of such Property by the transporting Employee or partner or such other person, and to end immediately upon
delivery thereof at destination.
529 F.2d at 493 (emphasis omitted).
:A Id. at 494.
I at 494-95.
Id.
' 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
62 In reaching this construction, the district court had relied heavily on the use of the
definitional terms of "checks paid" and "money lent" in 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970). Colorado
ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979, 983-85 (D. Colo. 1975).
This restrictive view of the terms has since been criticized. 11 TuImA L.J. 85 (1975).
" Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 184 (1976).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the overriding purpose of 12 U.S.C. § 36 was to place
national and state banks on a level of "competitive equality" regarding branch banking.
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services and facilities within the definition of branch banking."

M.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

Burgess Construction Co. v. M. Morrin & Son Co. 6" involved
a suit by a subcontractor against a government contractor for an
alleged breach of an implied obligation under the subcontract.6"
Morrin, the subcontractor, agreed to perform concrete work for
Burgess according to a contractual schedule dependent upon Burgess providing access to the sites on certain dates. Various delays
prevented access on the specified dates, and as a result the work
was not completed on time. Both parties brought separate suits
under the contract which were consolidated for trial. Morrin asserted that Burgess was contractually bound to provide access on
the specified dates and, therefore, had breached this express and
implied covenant.
The Tenth Circuit construed the contract as not including an
express covenant to provide access." However, the court noted
that an implied covenant not to hinder or delay access might
nonetheless exist in the absence of a contractual clause contemplating and excusing the delay. The court held that a contractual
provision allowing extensions of time for the subcontractor's performance in the event of delay demonstrated some evidence of the
intent of the parties to allow delay. Therefore, no implied obligation existed."'
540 F.2d at 499-500. The Colorado law on branch banking, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6-101(1)
(1973), would prohibit state banks from maintaining banking machines under similar
circumstances. Accordingly, prohibition of federal use of these machines served to preserve this equality in Colorado. 540 F.2d at 500. A question arises whether the same
reasoning would have been applied had Colorado state authorities permitted the use of
these machines, or had merely not yet made a determination.
0 540 F.2d at 499-500. The Tenth Circuit found the proper construction of 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(f) (1970) to be that the statute provided examples, but not limitations, of what
constituted branch banking. In any event, the withdrawal of funds and the transfer of
funds from one account to another were traditional banking functions "well within the
prohibition of the statute." 540 F.2d at 500.
- 526 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 176 (1976).
" The subcontractor's action was based on the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1970),
which allows suits on government contractors' bonds to be brought in federal district
courts. 526 F.2d at 110 n.1. See generally 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1970).
11 526 F.2d at 113. Reading the contract as a whole the court concluded that the
parties did not intend that Burgess be absolutely required to provide access on the specified dates. Id.
" On this theory, the Tenth Circuit harmonized the cases of George A. Fuller Co. v.
United States, 69 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1947) and United States v. Howard P. Foley Co.,
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IV.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR

A. U.C.C.C.70 and the Truth in Lending Act 7 '
In Hinkle v. Rock Springs NationalBank, 2 the Tenth Circuit
reaffirmed the rule that a bank and a credit seller who fail to
disclose the necessary financing information as required by the
Truth in Lending Act are jointly liable for the statutory penalty.73
Since the lack of disclosure violated both U.C.C.C. and Truth in
Lending Act requirements, it was argued that penalties under
both statutes could be recovered. The Tenth Circuit rejected this
argument because Wyoming credit transactions had been declared exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act following the state's adoption of the U.C.C.C. 4 The
exemption, however, only served to replace the federal requirements with the almost identical requirements of the U.C.C.C. 75
and did not affect concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.7' The
court concluded that the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction, but there could only be one cause of action and one
recovery for a non-disclosure."
B. Effect of U. C. C.C. on Negotiable Instruments
Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.7 8 presented questions concerning the effect of U.C.C.C. remedial provisions 9 on the U.C.C.
definition of negotiability. 0 The plaintiffs had bought homes
329 U.S. 64 (1946), concluding that an implied obligation only exists in the absence of a
contract clause contemplating the delay. 526 F.2d at 114.
In addition, the court noted that even if there were an implied obligation it would
not be breached by good faith delay: "Breach of an implied promise not to hinder or delay
the other party's performance is not established merely by proving there was delay. The
delay must be unnecessary, unreasonable or due to defendant's fault." Id. at 115. Morrin
had successfully objected to the introduction of any evidence of good or bad faith at the
time of trial, but other evidence indicated that Burgess had acted in good faith and that
the delays were not unreasonable. Id.
,0 Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
71 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1681s (1970).
72 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1976).
71Id. at 297. Both were creditors under the act and responsible for the disclosures.
Id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(s), 226.6(d) (1976).
1, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1968). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (1976).
,5 538 F.2d at 298. U.C.C.C. § 2-301(2); Wyo. STAT. § 40-2-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
7' See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1976).
'7 538 F.2d at 298.
78 535 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1976).
7' U.C.C.C. § 5-202.
- U.C.C. § 3-104(l).
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from the defendant, signing negotiable notes to cover the mortgage debt, in violation of the U.C.C.C. 81 The trial court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims for refund of the finance charge and for the
statutory penalty; the Tenth Circuit reversed. 2
The principal issue on appeal was whether the U.C.C.C. provision prohibiting the use of negotiable instruments in consumer
transactions made the notes nonnegotiable. The Tenth Circuit
read U.C.C.C. section 2-403 as plainly indicating the intent not
to render the notes nonnegotiable. 3 This conclusion followed from
the fact that under section 2-403 a holder could not be a holder
in due course if he took the instrument with notice that it was
issued in violation of the section. This was the sanction imposed
on the use of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions;
therefore, the notes in question remained negotiable.84
It was also argued that the prepayment and rebate provisions
of the U.C.C.C.85 rendered the sum of the note uncertain and,
therefore, nonnegotiable." The court found that the note itself
did not allude to anything creating uncertainty but was simply
an unencumbered promise to pay a definite sum. 7 The court
stated: "Even if a holder in due course were subject to the prepayment rebate provision, it could operate only as a defense; it would
not render the original instrument non-negotiable..""
A final point covered by the court involved plaintiffs' right
to bring a class action. The trial court denied the right because
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a class action was a superior
method for conducting the litigation. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that a single suit where one party was awarded
damages and where the court ordered one negotiable instrument
changed into a nonnegotiable one would not solve the problems
of the other members of the class. 0 Here the class was large but
91U.C.C.C. § 2-403 prohibits the seller from taking a negotiable instrument other
than a check as evidence of the buyer's obligation.
12 535 F.2d at 585, 589.
11Id. at 586.
IId.
U.C.C.C. §§ 2-209, 210.
U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 106.
'7 535 F.2d at 588.
' Id. at 587 (emphasis in original).
'5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
535 F.2d at 589.
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not unmanageable and if all the parties were before the court
"complete justice" could be accomplished in one action." Furthermore, it was error for the district court to refuse to certify the
class action on the ground that the damages would be prohibitively high.2
C.

Brief Mention

In Surveillance Corp. v. Sentry Insurance,3 a mortgagee had
the right under the mortgage to collect attorney's fees in the event
of default and foreclosure. However, at the time of foreclosure this
sum was not presented as part of the claim. The foreclosure produced more funds than expected, and the mortgagee filed a separate claim for attorney's fees. The court held that the mortgagee's
claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.11 The court noted
that the mortgagee was in error when it claimed that the two
actions were divisible: one for debt and one for contractual obligation to pay attorney's fees. Both claims gave rise to a single indebtedness, and therefore the enforcement of one barred an action for the other.9 5
In United States v. Immordino,6 the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the general rule that joint guarantors of an indebtedness
are entitled to demand proportionate contribution from each
other in payment of the debt. 7 However, in Immordino this right
was waived by a written clause in a Small Business Administration (S.B.A.) guaranty form that allowed the S.B.A. to settle
claims against such guarantor without affecting liability of the
others. 8
V.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Forward Contracts

A.

Following the trend in the Fifth Circuit,99 the Tenth Circuit,
"1

Id.

92

Id.

,3 538 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 300.
Id.

534 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1381.
" Id. at 1382.
" E.g., Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975); Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1974).
I

'?
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in Bradford v. PlainsCotton CooperativeAssociation, 0 held that
forward contracts' 0' for the sale of cotton were enforceable even
though "unconscionable" at the time of performance. In 1973 the
Association made numerous forward contracts, at the then current price, with numerous cotton growers in Oklahoma. However,
at the time for delivery the market price of cotton had more than
doubled and the growers brought suit to invalidate the contracts.
The trial court found the contracts invalid.' Reversing, the
Tenth Circuit held that the great increase in price had nothing
to do with unconscionability: "The test is the character of the
contract at the time of its making."'0 3 Nothing showed unfairness
at the time of execution. The Association's expertise in the cotton
market did not result in an inequality of bargaining power that
would make the contracts unconscionable. The Association had
immediately sold seventy-five percent of the cotton it purchased
under each contract; therefore, its "expertise" was not used to
predict the price increase.104
Proceeds of Security

B.

In McConnico v. Alliance Business Investment Co. (In re
Rose Homes, Inc.), 105the trustee in bankruptcy sought return of
certain bank funds taken by Alliance after the bankrupt's insolvency and within four months of the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings.'10 Alliance claimed these funds as proceeds of security held in a bank account;0 7 the trustee, however, contended
that it was instead an invalid security interest in an account. 08
Alliance had loaned money to the bankrupt, Rose Homes,
Inc., on the condition that the loan amount be placed in an income trust account controlled by Alliance.0 9 These monies were
539 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
"I A forward contract is a contract whereby a grower agrees to sell crops grown on
designated acreage during a certain crop year for delivery after harvesting. Id. at 1251.
'0

Id.

Id. at 1255. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment 1.
539 F.2d at 1255.
'05No. 75-1178 (10th Cir., Nov. 19, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
I" The trustee asserted that there had been a preferential transfer in violation of
section 60(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
'" See U.C.C. § 9-306.
,09U.C.C. § 9-104(k).
' The loan agreement required Rose to deposit all its corporate receipts in the income trust account. Furthermore, Rose executed a security agreement and financing
"
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transferred to the bankrupt's checking account as needed and
constituted the sole source of funds for that account. After the
bankrupt became insolvent, it transferred $19,450 to Alliance
from the checking account as payment on the loan.
The issue was whether a secured party loses its security interest in identifiable proceeds if the proceeds are deposited in the
debtor's checking account. The Tenth Circuit, reversing the
bankruptcy and district courts, held that the funds were covered
proceeds of the security trust account, and therefore were not
preferential transfers." 0 The court noted that the fact that the
entire bank account was proceeds did not mean that the bank
account itself was security. Rather, it merely made identification
of the proceeds simpler.
Thus, one way of insuring that cash proceeds of a loan will
remain identifiable "proceeds" under the U.C.C. is to require a
debtor to establish special accounts to hold these funds separate
from others."' This will not create a prohibited security interest
in a bank account, but would tie the funds to the original source
for identification.
Percival Construction Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers,
Inc. ' involved the right to proceeds from an auction sale of construction equipment. The P&A Construction Company (P&A)
"leased" heavy equipment from the Percival Construction Company (Percival) under an agreement that included an option to
purchase at a stated price and provided that ninety-three percent
of all monthly payments were to be applied toward the purchase
price." 3 After obtaining possession of the equipment P&A borrowed from the Stock Yards Bank (Bank), giving security interests in all its accounts receivable and certain listed equipment as
statement covering all of its current and after-acquired inventory, equipment, accounts
receivable, contract rights, and general intangibles. Proceeds were specifically covered in
the agreement and financing statement, and the parties agreed that the security interests
created were properly perfected. No. 75-1178 at 2.
. Id. at 5-6.
"I U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) covers cash proceeds of security so long as they are identifiable.
112 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976).
"I Percival did not file a financing statement covering the equipment. 387 F. Supp.
at 884.
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collateral."' Included by mistake in the list of equipment intended as collateral were two backhoes covered by the P&APercival lease.
P&A became financially distressed and, in conjunction with
the Bank and Percival, arranged to have Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. (Miller) sell the equipment involved. During this
same period the United States filed two liens against P&A for
unpaid taxes. When the equipment was sold, Percival, the Bank,
and the United States each demanded a portion of the proceeds
from Miller, but because the claims exceeded the sale price no
disbursements were made. Percival brought a diversity action
against Miller for the proceeds. Miller counterclaimed and interpleaded the other claimants and deposited into the court the
gross proceeds of the sale, less expenses and commissions.
The trial court found that the P&A-Percival lease was actually a conditional sale with the reservation of an unperfected
security interest by Percival and, recognizing the Bank's priority,
granted a partial summary judgment against Percival in favor of
the Bank."' Verdicts were directed in favor of Miller, the Bank,
and the United States; Percival and the United States appealed
'6
to the Tenth Circuit."
Percival first argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the interpleader action because Miller had not deposited
into the court the entire sum in his possession as required by
federal statute."7 Miller's counterclaim, however, was not based
on the statute but on Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." '8 The Tenth Circuit found that the entire sum requirement
did not apply to actions under the Rule" 9 and that Miller had
acted properly under the Rule. Compliance with the statutory
requirements for jurisdiction was not required because the court
" The bank perfected its security interests by filing financing statements. 532 F.2d
at 169.
,, 387 F. Supp. at 887. See also 532 F.2d at 170.
"
532 F.2d at 170.
117 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
I, 532 F.2d at 170.
"' In interpleader actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 22 the amount that must be deposited
is left to the court's discretion. 532 F.2d at 171. See also Emmco Ins. Co. v. Frankford
Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Coumantaros, 146 F. Supp.
51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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had already assumed jurisdiction based on diversity.' 0
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's determination
that the P&A-Percival lease was actually a sale with the reservation of a security interest in Percival.'"' The U.C.C. definition of
a security interest provides that while the inclusion of an option
to purchase in a lease does not necessarily make the lease one
intended for security, when the agreement provides that the lessee may purchase at the end of the term for little or no consideration then the lease is intended as security.' 2 The determinative
factors are the consideration necessary to exercise the purchase
option and the percentage the consideration bears to the list price
23
of the items leased.'
Percival also argued that it was error to grant a directed
verdict in favor of the Bank because they had entered into an
informal subordination agreement regarding the Bank's interest
in the proceeds from the sale. The Tenth Circuit held that the
motion was properly granted because the agreement was based
upon a. mutual mistake that went to the essence of the contract
24
and, under Oklahoma law, was therefore unenforceable.'
On appeal the United States challenged the trial court's finding that the Bank had a perfected security interest, as accounts
receivable, in the proceeds from the sale of equipment that was
not listed as collateral on the security agreements between the
Bank and P&A.' 2 5 The Bank argued that it had a perfected
"2

2

532 F.2d at 171.

Id. at 171-72.

,2 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
22 532 F.2d at 171. The leading case on this issue, Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic
Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969), held that if the percentage is less than
25% it shows the parties' intention to make the lease serve as security. In the instant case
the purchase option price was 10.6% of the list price. Furthermore, 93% of the "rent"
payments were applied toward the purchase price. 532 F.2d at 174. See also In re Royer's
Bakery, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963). There is an indication that a lease
is intended to create a security interest if under the terms of the agreement the only
sensible alternative at the end of the term is to exercise the option. 532 F.2d at 172.
24 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 53, 62-64 (West 1972); Watkins v. Grady County
Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 438 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1968). The mutual mistake was that
Percival owned the equipment. 532 F.2d at 172. The court used the same analysis to
uphold a directed verdict against Percival and in favor of Miller on the issue of an agreement regarding disbursement of the sale proceeds. Id. at 173.
' The government conceded that the Bank had a prior perfected security interest in
the P&A equipment specifically identified in the financing statement, i.e., the two backhoes. 532 F.2d at 173.
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security interest in all of P&A's accounts receivable which included the auction sale proceeds because P&A had a right to
payment for the goods sold by Miller as auctioneer. The Tenth
Circuit applied Oklahoma law and determined that Miller was
acting as P&A's agent. Since payment had been made to the
agent, P&A had no further right to receive payment from the
buyer and, therefore, the proceeds were not an account receivable. For this reason the directed verdict in favor of the Bank was
reversed.2 6
C.

Commercially Reasonable Sale of Collateral

Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Division
of the Rucker Co. 127was an interpleader action' 8 in which Mrs.
Bailey, the holder of a subordinate security interest in an oil rig,
claimed that the Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. (Liberty)
had sold the rig in a commercially unreasonable manner.'2 9
Liberty had no previous experience with selling oil rigs and
therefore made inquiries regarding the method by which such
sales were usually conducted. Liberty was advised that ordinarily
the rig was moved to a convenient location, cleaned, painted, and
sold by a professional auctioneer. Generally, interested persons
were notified and advertisements placed in trade journals and
30
newspapers.
Liberty did not follow any of this advice but rather had a
bank attorney who had no experience with oil drilling equipment
conduct the auction. The rig was not cleaned, painted, or moved
to a convenient site. Furthermore, the sale was conducted during
a snowstorm.' 3' The rig had been appraised at $60,000 to $80,000
but the final sale price was $42,000.32 In this state of affairs the
Tenth Circuit found that the trial court's ruling that the sale was
33
commercially unreasonable was supported by the evidence.'
Gilbert Porter
, Id. at 173-74.
'!? 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).

,2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
I" Liberty had a prior security interest in the rig which belonged to Tarus, an oil
drilling company. Tarus agreed that Liberty should sell the rig and apply the proceeds
toward the debt owed to Liberty. Liberty, however, had notice of Mrs. Bailey's interest.
540 F.2d at 1377.
"3

Id.

Id. at 1377, 1382.
,"2
Id. at 1377.
11 Id. at 1382.
"I
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NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS AND THE BANK HOLDING

COMPANY ACT

Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d

1221 (10th Cir. 1976)
INTRODUCTION

Within the last two years, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has decided two major cases involving
applications for a national bank charter where the proposed bank
was to be part of a bank holding company: Bank of Boulder v.
Board of Governors' and Bank of Commerce v. Smith.2 These
cases and the Tenth Circuit's understanding of Whitney National
Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,I the National Bank
Act,4 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 19561 are the subject
of this Comment.
I.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

A.

Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors'
Bank of Boulder arose out of the efforts of Westland Banks,
Inc., a bank holding company (Westland), to establish a subsidiary bank in the vicinity of the Bank of Boulder. The Bank of
Boulder was a state bank which opened for business only a year
before in the spring of 1972. Westland filed an application with
the state banking authorities to move its subsidiary state bank
to the new Boulder location.7 After a public hearing in which the
Bank of Boulder appeared as a protesting witness, the Colorado
State Banking Board voted to deny Westland's request.' The
state board found that the proposed service area of Westland's
subsidiary overlapped the primary service area of the Bank of
Boulder and held that to grant Westland's application "would
1535

F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
379 U.S. 411 (1965).
'12 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1970).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1970).
535 F.2d 1221 (10th Cir. 1976).
The procedures for application for a Colorado state banking charter are outlined in
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-3-109, -110 (1973).
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1222 (10th Cir. 1976).
2
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result in the creation of two weak and unprofitable banks in the
Boulder area." 9
The state board's decision was made October 26, 1973. On
November 5, 1973, before the final order was entered, Westland
applied to the United States Comptroller of Currency (Comptroller) for a nationally chartered bank in the identical location. 0 The
Comptroller granted preliminary approval of the proposed national bank conditioned upon the approval by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (Board of Governors) of
Westland's acquisition of the controlling shares of the new bank."
The Board of Governors approved Westland's application to acquire the controlling shares.
The Bank of Boulder appealed the Board of Governors' decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
which upheld the Board of Governors' decision approving Westland's application. 3 Thus, a bank holding company was denied
a banking charter in a state procedure but was granted a charter
under the same circumstances in a federal procedure. 4
I Id. at

1223.

10Id.
1 In order to acquire a national bank charter, associations must follow the procedures
of formation outlined in the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1970), and apply to
the Comptroller who may grant the charter application pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27
(1970). The Comptroller's regulations provide that he may condition his final approval
upon the fulfillment of conditions specified by him which in this situation is the approval
of Westland's acquisition of the controlling shares of the new bank by the Board of
Governors. 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) (1976). The Comptroller conditions his final approval on the
Board's approval of the application to acquire the controlling shares because the Bank
Holding Company Act provides that it is
unlawful, except with prior approval of the Board, ...
(3) for any bank
holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any
voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will directly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting
shares of such bank ....
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1970).
" Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 1225. Any party aggrieved by an order of the Board may appeal the Board's
decision to a federal court of appeals. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970). A party who would become
a competitor of the applicant has the right as an aggrieved party to obtain judicial review
as provided in section 1848. 12 U.S.C. § 1850 (1970).
11For a comprehensive discussion of competitive equality between national and state
banks, see Redford, DualBanking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB.
749 (1966). This apparent inequality will not be discussed in this Comment. However,
such a decision may have an effect on the dual banking system which provides for national
and state banks to exist side by side essentially in competition since both have the power
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The Tenth Circuit held that in charter application cases involving bank holding companies, the decision of the Comptroller
is not subject to independent court review, and the only review
is that of the Board of Governors' decision. 5 The court noted the
discretionary authority of the Board to hold hearings and, following the authority of other circuits, held that there is no constitutional or statutory right for a protesting bank to have a hearing
before the Board." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
granting of the national charter to Westland, holding that the
7
findings of the Board were supported by substantial evidence.
B.

Bank of Commerce v. Smith"

Bank of Commerce was decided nearly a year before Bank of
Boulder.'" In Bank of Commerce, a protesting state bank sought
judicial review of the Comptroller's actions in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming. The protesting bank
asserted that political influence had prompted the Comptroller to
grant approval for a national charter to a proposed subsidiary of
a bank holding company.20 The district court determined that it
to grant charters. Congress has chosen to maintain a "competitive equality" between state
and national banks by refusing to exercise its power to preempt the field. The Bank
Holding Company Act contains several provisions calculated to preserve the position of
the states. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970) provides that the state supervisory authority should
be consulted about an application for acquisition and section 1846 provides that states
may exercise powers and jurisdiction over bank holding companies.
15Since both agencies consider the same factors and since it is the
"exclusive function of the Board to act in such cases," Whitney Bank, the
decision of the Comptroller is not subject to independent review. Instead
review of the proceedings under the Bank Holding Company Act is limited
to the actions of the Board of Governors.
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1976).
11Id. at 1224-25. If the application for approval to acquire shares is disapproved by
the Comptroller, the Board must hold hearings. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970). However,
where the Comptroller does not disapprove, the Board in its discretion may allow oral
argument or hold hearings for the purpose of taking evidence. Bank of Commerce v. Board
of Governors, 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975). Commercial Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v.
Board of Governors, 451 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1971), held that where the Comptroller recommends approval of the application, it is established that a protestant has no constitutional right to a hearing before the Board. Northwest Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 303 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1962) held that there is no statutory right to a hearing.
" "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive." 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970).
IN513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975).
10Bank of Commerce was decided in March 1975 and Bank of Boulder was decided
in June 1976.
" 513 F.2d at 169.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 54

lacked jurisdiction to review the actions of the Comptroller in
bank holding company situations and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 2 ' Relying on Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans & Trust Co., 2 the Tenth Circuit held that there is no
independent court review of the Comptroller's decision in bank
holding company applications; that review of the proceedings
under the Bank Holding Company Act is limited to the Board of
Governors' decisions; and that only the court of appeals may
review those decisions.?
In both Bank of Commerce and Bank of Boulder, the Tenth
Circuit held that review of the Comptroller's actions is different
when an independent bank is applying for a national charter than
when a bank holding company is involved. 2 The Tenth Circuit
arrived at this conclusion on the basis of Whitney Bank and the
requirement under the Bank Holding Company Act that the
Board must grant approval of the acquisition of shares of a new
bank by a bank holding company.2 5 An examination of the perti2, Id. at 168-69.

379 U.S. 411 (1965).
Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 1976); Bank
of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 169 (10th Cir. 1975).
The Overview of the Commercial Law section of the Second Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey reviews Bank of Commerce and two other cases involving bank holding companies:
American Bank v. Smith, 503 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1974), and Bank of Commerce v. Board
of Governors, 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975). 53 DEN. L.J. 55-56 (1975). Bank of Commerce
v. Board of Governors is a companion case to Bank of Commerce v. Smith which is
discussed in the text.
" In Bank of Commerce, the court said:
The standard of review of the Comptroller's action upon an application of
an independent bank is set forth in Camp, Comptroller v. Pitts . . . . However, it is obvious that this issue is not reached because of the dual approval
required here of the new bank as a subsidiary of a holding company, and by
reason of the Supreme Court's decision as to the proper sequence in the much
cited case of Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans.
513 F.2d at 169 (citations omitted).
In Bank of Boulder, the court discussed its decision in Bank of Commerce saying,
"This court first noted that the case of Camp, Comptroller v. Pitts outlined the applicable
standard of review of the Comptroller's action upon application for charter by an independent bank. But we recognized the different role of the Comptroller in proceedings involving the Bank Holding Company Act." 535 F.2d at 1224 (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court in Camp v. Pitts held: "The appropriate standard
for review was, accordingly, whether the Comptroller's adjudication was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' as specified in 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) [the Administrative Procedure Act]." 411 U.S. 138, 142.
" See note 24 supra. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) provides that the Board must approve the
acquisition of shares of a new bank by a bank holding company.
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nent provisions of the National Bank Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act in light of the facts of Whitney Bank indicates that
the Tenth Circuit's decision represents an unwarranted extension
of bank holding company procedures to applications for a national charter.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The National Bank Act" governs application procedures to
establish an independent bank and to establish a subsidiary of a
bank holding company. The applicant first files a charter application with the Comptroller. 7 If the Comptroller determines that
the association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of
banking, he grants a certificate to commence business.28 The
Comptroller may condition final approval on fulfillment of conditions specified by him. 29 Judicial review of the Comptroller's decision is available in the federal district court."
Another step in the procedure is added when the applicant
is to be controlled by a bank holding company. The Bank Holding
Company Act 3' makes it unlawful for a holding company to form,
acquire, merge, or consolidate with another bank without the
prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board. 2 The holding company must submit an application for approval to acquire the
controlling shares of the new bank to the Board of Governors. 3
Therefore, the Comptroller may condition his final approval of
the charter application upon the approval by the Board of Governors of the holding company's application to acquire controlling
interest in the newly chartered subsidiary. 34 The Bank Holding
Company Act provides that review of the Board's decision may
3
be had in the federal court of appeals. 1

2
2

12 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1970).
Id. § 21.
Id. 88 26-27.

12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) (1976).
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973). See note 24 supra.
31 12 U.S.C. 88 1841-1850 (1970).
2 Id. § 1842(a).
- 12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (1976).
12 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) provides: "If preliminary approval is granted, the Comptroller
may, if he determines that such action is necessary or desirable for the protection of public
interest, at any time withdraw such approval or provide that final approval shall be
subject to the fulfillment of conditions specified by him."
12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970).
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The distinction between the charter application and the application to acquire the controlling shares of the new bank is
extremely important. Bank holding companies have to file both
a charter application and an application to acquire controlling
shares, while an independent bank only has to file a charter application. The Tenth Circuit did not distinguish the two kinds of
applications stating that: "It is apparent that this two-track approach by appellant is derived from the fact that separate agencies and statutes are involved, but the arguments are foreclosed
by the Supreme Court's opinion in the Whitney Bank case herein'36
after referred to."
The.Bank Holding Company Act was apparently intended to
supplement the already existing National Bank Act. The Bank
Holding Company Act deals with only the holding company's
application for acquisition of controlling interest and not the
charter application itself.3 7 The Board of Governors is required to
forward a copy of the application for acquisition to the Comptroller for his recommendation.3 If the Comptroller disapproves the
application, the Board must hold a hearing;3 9 otherwise, the
Board is not required to conduct a hearing." The Comptroller is
a consultant with regard to the application for acquisition,
whereas he is the decision maker in the charter application.4
These procedures are so distinct that even the identity of the
applicant parties may differ; in Bank of Commerce, the individual organizers of the proposed subsidiary filed the charter application with the Comptroller, and the bank holding company, a
Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 168 (10th Cir. 1975).
3'This conclusion is reached because the Bank Holding Company Act does not cover
charter application procedures and the National Bank Act clearly outlines the procedure
for charter applications.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970).
31 Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.3(c) (1976).
, See note 39 supra.
" This section is a compromise between the position that the Comptroller should
have the authority to veto the application to acquire shares and the position that the
Comptroller should have only an informal consulting role which would not necessarily be
heeded. The compromise provides for input from the Comptroller whereby he recommends
approval or denial of the application, but retains the final decisionmaking authority to
approve the application to acquire shares with the Board. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [19561 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2482, 2490.
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separate entity, filed the application for acquisition with the
42
Board of Governors.
In the Bank Holding Company Act, Congress intended to
regulate the growth of bank holding companies in order to discourage monopolies and to confine holding company activities to
the management and control of banks.43 It does not appear that
this Act was intended to remove bank holding companies from
the purview of the National Bank Act; instead, it was designed
to regulate the one aspect of bank holding companies which distinguishes them from independent banks: that these subsidiary
banks are part of a bank holding company and thus are able by
this affiliation to exercise greater influence in the banking market.44 Thus, an applicant for a national bank charter files his
application with the Comptroller under the National Bank Act
whether the bank is to be an independent bank or a subsidiary
of a bank holding company. A bank holding company must take
the additional step of filing under the Bank Holding Company
Act with the Board of Governors for approval of acquisition.
It is this dual function of the Comptroller and the two relevant statutory provisions that are the basis of the Tenth Circuit's apparent misunderstanding of these application procedures. The Tenth Circuit has held that some aspects of the National Bank Act apply to bank holding company applications and
others do not; specifically, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the
charter application is made to the Comptroller as prescribed in
the National Bank Act but held that review of the Comptroller
in bank holding company applications is precluded by the Bank
Holding Company Act.45
Whitney National Bank v. Bank of
46
New Orleans & Trust Co.
In light of the statutory background, Whitney Bank should
be distinguished on its facts from the Tenth Circuit cases. In
III.

1 Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir.
1975).
13

S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEWS 2482.
I/d.
'5 Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 168-69 (10th Cir. 1975); Bank of Boulder
v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 1976).
11379 U.S. 411 (1965).
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Whitney Bank, the protesting banks were challenging the acquisition of a new national bank in the adjoining county by a holding
company created for the purpose of circumventing the laws of
Louisiana prohibiting branch banking. 7 Whitney National Bank
of New Orleans (Whitney-New Orleans) wanted to establish another national bank in an adjoining parish.48 Louisiana law prohibits the opening of branch offices by banks in other than their
home parish. 9 State branch banking laws are applicable to national banks by 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1970).10 In order to avoid the
branch banking laws, Whitney-New Orleans organized a bank
holding company. "The net result of the maneuver would be that
the original stockholders of the old Whitney-New Orleans would
own the holding company which in turn would own and operate
both banks, i.e., the new Whitney-New Orleans and WhitneyJefferson."'" The Board of Governors approved the plan May 3,
1962.52 Louisiana subsequently passed a law, effective July 10,
1962, prohibiting the opening of subsidiaries of bank holding companies within the state. 3 The protesting banks sought judicial
review of the Board's decision in the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit on June 30, 1962, as provided in 12 U.S.C. § 1848.
That case was pending when this Supreme Court case was decided. 4
In this suit taken up to the Supreme Court, the protesting
banks were attacking the authority of the Comptroller to issue a
certificate. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1846, reserved to the states final authority to prohibit the opening of subsidiaries within their borders and, even though Louisiana adopted such a law after the Board's approval, the Comptroller should be enjoined from issuing the certificate. The
Board's approval was not final because the decision was being
reviewed in the court of appeals. On appeal from the district
court, the court of appeals upheld the district court decision,
'7

Id. at 413.

Id.
IX
49

Id. n.1.
Id.
Id. at 415-16.

5ZId. at 416.

Id. at 414 & n.4.
Id. at 413 & n.2.
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concluding that the proposed Jefferson Parish bank would be but
a branch of Whitney-New Orleans which was prohibited by the
Act. The Supreme Court held:
We have concluded that the District Court for the District of Columbia had no jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the holding company
proposal; that appropriate disposition of the controversy cannot be
made without further consideration of the case by the Federal Reserve Board, where original exclusive jurisdiction rests; and that
since the application for review of its decision is now pending in the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reasonable time should be
allowed for that court to act."

The Supreme Court made the distinction that its decision
was a response to a complaint attacking the propriety of the
holding company arrangement itself, not an attack on the Comptroller's decision to create a new national bank:
We think it clear that the thrust of respondents' complaint goes
to the organization of Whitney-Jefferson by the holding company
rather than merely the issuance of authority to Whitney-Jefferson
to do business. Respondents' chief contention is that WhitneyJefferson would be but a branch bank of Whitney-New Orleans. But
this would not follow simply by virtue of the issuance of authority
for the opening of the new bank. Such a situation would occur, if at
all, when the Board approved the holding company plan including
the organization of Whitney-Jefferson as its subsidiary. Thus, it is
the plan of organization by the holding company which lies at the
heart of respondents' argument ...
The respondents also argue that the operation of WhitneyJefferson is barred by a valid state law prohibiting any subsidiary
of a bank holding company from opening for business "whether or
not, a charter, permit, license or certificate to open for business has
already been issued." Here, as with their first argument, respondents' quarrel is in actuality not merely with the opening of the
bank, but rather with its opening as a subsidiary of Whitney Holding Corporation. m
Id. at 414-15. The Court went on to say:
Again, the Board could not approve a holding company arrangement involving the organization and opening of a new bank if the opening of the bank,
by reason of its ownership by a bank holding company, would be prohibited
by a valid state law.
We therefore conclude that respondents' complaint tenders issues cognizable by the Federal Reserve Board, and we turn to the question of whether
such objections must first be raised there.
Id. at 418-19.
1' Id. at 417-18.
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The Supreme Court explored the legislative history of the Bank
Holding Company Act in order to buttress its conclusion that the
Board is the sole means by which the organization of a new bank
may be tested. It is this author's opinion that the Court was
referring to questions pertaining to the holding company arrangement itself, but not to the issuance of a certificate to do business,
i.e., to the applicationfor acquisition of the controlling shares
made to the Board, but not to the application for a national
charter made to the Comptroller. For instance, the Court said:
That action by Congress [to provide review in the court of appeals]
was designed to permit an agency, expert in banking matters, to
explore and pass on the ramifications of a proposed bank holding
company arrangement. To permit a district court to make the initial
determination of a plan's propriety would substantially decrease the
effectiveness of the statutory design.7

There would be no reason for Congress to change the procedure
for reviewing the actions of the Comptroller simply because a
bank holding company was making the application for a charter.
The Bank Holding Company Act provisions deal only with the
intricacies of bank holding company arrangements which are to
be reviewed by a board of experts and thereafter subject to judicial review in the court of appeals.
Thus, Whitney Bank was limited to a controversy concerning
the propriety of the bank holding company's applicationfor
acquisition. Controversies concerning the Comptroller's actions
in response to a charter application by an independent bank or
by a bank holding company were not reached by Whitney Bank.
The Tenth Circuit has, therefore, extended the Whitney Bank
decision by holding that it is the "exclusive function of the Board
to act" in all cases involving bank holding companies, not merely
those instances where the acquisition arrangement is challenged
as was the situation in Whitney Bank. 5
In Bank of Commerce, the protesting banks challenged the
propriety of the actions of the Comptroller in granting the charter
because of alleged political influence.59 Similarly, in Bank of
7 Id. at 420.
5' Bank of Boulder v. Board of Governors, 535 F.2d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1976) (quoting Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 419 (1965)).
(1965)).
11 513 F.2d at 169.
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Boulder, the actions of the Comptroller in deciding to grant a
charter were challenged by the Bank of Boulder.'" Yet, the Tenth
Circuit held that Whitney Bank controlled in both cases even
though the issue was the Comptroller's actions in response to the
charter application and not a question of the organization of the
holding company or its acquisition of the subsidiary bank which
by statute is limited to the Board.
Whitney Bank was distinguished by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1973 in First National
Bank of Homestead v. Watson."' In Homestead, the protesting
banks challenged the Comptroller's approval of a bank holding
company charter application in the district court on the basis of
his failure to comply with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).62 The court distinguished
Whitney Bank on its facts by pointing out that the issues in
Whitney Bank were clearly those reserved to the Board and that
plaintiffs were in reality challenging a decision of the Board by
collaterally attacking the Comptroller.13 In contrast to Whitney
Bank, the complaint in Homestead was clearly against the actions of the Comptroller. 4 The court held that the actions of the
Comptroller are independently reviewable even when bank holding companies are involved if the complaint concerns the Comptroller's granting of the charter and not the Board's approval of
the application for acquisition. 5 Homestead thus rejected the
contention that Whitney Bank precluded district court review of
the Comptroller in bank holding company cases and distinguished between claims against the Board as in Whitney Bank
and claims against the Comptroller.
In Bank of Commerce, the Tenth Circuit considered the decision in Homestead but said that "the considerations there were
entirely different as the only issue was the claim under the
NEPA." 6 Yet, the issue in Homestead was also whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear complaints made against the

"

"

535 F.2d at 1223.
363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
363 F. Supp. at 471.
IId.
Id. at 468-71.
513 F.2d at 169.
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Comptroller in bank holding company cases or whether all complaints made with respect to bank holding company charter applications must be resolved by the Board and reviewable only in
the court of appeals." It seems that the issue of whether the
Comptroller followed the proper procedure as prescribed by
NEPA in making his decision to grant a charter in Homestead is
parallel to the issue of whether the Comptroller was persuaded by
political considerations as alleged in Bank of Commerce.6" Both
complaints are solely with the propriety of the Comptroller's actions in response to charter applications by bank holding companies.
The Tenth Circuit should have distinguished the claims
against the Board from the claims against the Comptrolleras the
court did in Homestead. Instead, in Bank of Commerce, where
the principal claim challenged the Comptroller's considerations
in granting preliminary approval of the bank charter, the Tenth
Circuit held that Whitney Bank controlled:
There the Court held that the proper place to challenge the organization of a new holding company owned bank was in the proceedings
before the Board of Governors. . . .The Court considered the problems which would be caused by a challenge of the Comptroller's
action as an independent matter, and the duplication which would
result. The Supreme Court thus decided that the opposition must
". .. first attack the arrangement before the Board." 6

Yet, in Whitney Bank, the Court was talking about the duplication which would result if the protesting banks collaterally attacked the Board's determination in the district court by a suit
against the Comptroller, not whether there was a suit against the
Comptroller for his own actions.7" Whitney Bank did not reach
the issue of a claim solely against the Comptroller. Likewise, in
Bank of Boulder, the court relied on Whitney Bank even though
the claim was against the Comptroller and not against the Board.
The protesting banks brought before the Board the case against
the Comptroller and got review of the decision in the court of
appeals because they were foreclosed from bringing the issue before the district court against the Comptroller directly based on
7 363 F. Supp. at 471.
Id. at 472; 513 F.2d at 169.
513 F.2d at 169.
379 U.S. at 421-22.
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the Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Bank of Commerce. Nevertheless, the court reconfirmed its stand with respect to distinguishing between claims against the Comptroller and claims
against the Board saying:
Since both agencies consider the same factors and since it is the
"exclusive function of the Board to act in such cases," Whitney
Bank, the decision of the Comptroller is not subject to independent
review. Instead, review of the proceedings under the Bank Holding
Company Act is limited to the actions of the Board of Governors.7'

IV.

EFFECT OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

Based on the Tenth Circuit decisions, protestant banks have
two very different procedures to follow in order to challenge a
national charter application filed by an independent bank as opposed to one filed by a bank holding company: approval of charters for independent banks is challenged by review of the Comptroller's decision in federal district court; approval of charters
involving bank holding companies are reviewed in the court of
appeals based on the Board's decision.
There are several problems which arise from this situation.
One problem lies in the confusion that has arisen over these conflicting procedures.7 2 Another, more severe, problem is that in
bank holding company cases the decision of the Comptroller to
approve the charter is not reviewable. The Comptroller grants
preliminary approval of the charter application, conditions it
upon approval by a separate agency of a separate application for
acquisition, and then grants final approval of the charter application. The only reviewable decision is the narrow one of whether
the bank holding company conformed to the provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act. Neither the Bank Holding Company Act nor the National Bank Act gives the Board the authority to review the decision of the Comptroller; the statutes only
provide the Board with the authority to review the acquisition
arrangement.73 Therefore, it is possible that no review of the
11535 F.2d at 1224.
72

See note 77 infra.

12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970) discusses the role of the Comptroller with regard to the
application filed with the Board by the bank holding company to acquire the controlling
shares of the bank. No other section of the Bank Holding Company Act discusses the
Board's authority to review the Comptroller's decision on the charter application.
7'
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Comptroller's decision to grant a charter will be available in bank
holding company cases.
The results of the two cases in the Tenth Circuit demonstrate
these problems. In Bank of Commerce v. Board of Governors,"
the protesting bank filed its application for a state charter with
the state authorities a few months before the applicant bank filed
its application with the Comptroller. The Comptroller granted
preliminary approval to the applicant before the protesting state
bank received its approval.7 5 The protesting state bank wanted to
attack the actions of the Comptroller, but was precluded from
doing so." The protesting state bank also failed to appear before
the Board and, therefore, was foreclosed from protest or review
in that forum as well.77 There, the state bank was not challenging
the Board's approval of the acquisition plan but the charter approval of the Comptroller. The result was that the protesting
bank was deprived of access to a forum empowered to grant relief.
In Bank of Boulder, the protesting bank did not try to challenge the Comptroller's actions directly in the district court in
light of the Bank of Commerce decision. Bank of Boulder appeared before the Board, but was denied relief without a hearing.79 It then appealed the Board's decision to the court of appeals
and tried to attack the Comptroller's actions in that forum with
80
no success.
CONCLUSION

The most significant problem apparently created by the decisions of the Tenth Circuit is that the decisions of the Comptroller in response to charter applications by bank holding companies
are not reviewable. In the future, the application to the Comptroller for a charter and the application to acquire shares made to the
74513 F.2d 164, 165 (10th Cir. 1975). This is a companion case to Bank of Commerce
v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975), and the facts are the same.
513 F.2d at 165.
7 Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167, 169 (10th Cir. 1975).
Bank of Commerce v. Board of Governors, 513 F.2d 164, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1975),
held that since the protesting banks failed to assert their claims against the Comptroller
before the Board, they were barred from getting review in the court of appeals. Yet, the
reason protesting banks did not attack the application before the Board was that their
claim was against the Comptroller, not against the Board.
535 F.2d at 1222.
Id. at 1223-25.
Id. at 1223-24.
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Board should perhaps be more clearly differentiated so there is
less confusion in interpreting the relation of the National Bank
Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. Another approach
would be to distinguish Whitney Bank on its facts and recognize
that, although the language in Whitney Bank appeared broad, it
was limited to the narrow situation of an issue solely cognizable
by the Board. And last, perhaps the Bank Holding Company Act
itself could more clearly define the relationship of bank holding
companies to the Comptroller with respect to the charter applications and the extent to which the National Bank Act reaches
charter applications made by bank holding companies.
Constance C. Cox

